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The views expressed  in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily  reflect  those of the Federal  Reserve 
System  or  the Federal  Reserve  Bank of  Kansas  City. Banks  for  many  years  have  been  regarded  as  the  pillar  of 
stability  in  our  financial  system.  Over  the  last  decade,  however, 
significant  portions  of the  industry  have  been  at the  forefront  of 
each  recurring  crisis,  whether  it  be  energy,  agricultural,  real 
estate,  commercial,  or  LDC  lending.  Bank  lending  helped  foster  a 
boom-bust  cycle  that  went  well  beyond  the  basic  economic 
fundamentals  in  each  of  these  areas.  These  cycles  all  ended  with 
increased  bank  failure  rates  and  high  loan  losses.  This  result  has 
further  led  to  substantial  declines  in  the  bank  insurance  fund, 
causing  many  to  question  whether  banking  is  headed  in  the  same 
direction  as  the  thrift  industry  with  its  continuing  need  for 
taxpayer  funds. 
These  events  provide  a  strong  indication  that  banks  may  be 
suffering  from  something  more  serious  than  regional  downturns  or  a 
run  of bad  luck.  Recent  banking  problems  demonstrate  the  need  for 
significant  and  fundamental  reform  in  the  banking  and  financial 
system  --  a  reform  which  would  extend  well  beyond  the  changes 
incorporated  in  recent  federal  banking  legislation. 
This  article  examines  this  need  for  further  banking  reform  and 
takes  a closer  look  at one  alternative  --  "narrow  banking"  -- which 
could  dramatically  change  the  structure  and  operation  of  the  U.S. 
financial  system.  The  first  section  of  the  article  discusses  the 
need  for  fundamental  banking  reform,  as  demonstrated  by  the  basic 
weaknesses  inherent  in  the  U.S.  financial  system  and  in  recent 
legislative  efforts  to  reform  it.  The  second  part  provides  an 
overview  of  narrow  banking,  while  the  final  section  examines  some 
of  the  more  important  questions  that  narrow  banking  might  raise. -2- 
The  Need  for  Banking  Reform 
Beginning  with  the  198Os,  the  U.S.  banking  system  has 
demonstrated  a  number  of  weaknesses,  which  seem  linked  in  many 
cases  to  the  structure  of  federal  deposit  insurance.  Most  notable 
among  these  weaknesses  are:  (1) an  inability  to  maintain  a  safe 
and  stable  payments  system  without  significant  taxpayer  liability, 
(2) a banking  system  that  doesn't  respond  quickly  or  optimally  to 
market  forces  in allocating  credit  and  other  banking  services,  and 
(3) a regulatory  and  legislative  framework  that  is confining  banks 
to  a declining  and  more  risky  piece  of  the  financial  marketplace. 
While  these  banking  problems  have  led  to  several  major  pieces  of 
banking  legislation  and many  suggestions  for  further  reform,  nearly 
all  of  the  approaches  seem  to  involve  significant  compromises  and 
would  fail  to  correct  the  basic  flaws  in  our  banking  system. 
Payments  system  concerns 
Since  the  193Os,  the  United  States  has  placed  much  reliance  on 
federal  deposit  insurance,  backed  by  the  "full  faith  and  credit  of 
the  United  States  Government,"  in ensuring  depositors  of the  safety 
of  their  funds  and  in  protecting  the  payments  system.  The 
possibility  of systemic  problems  and  threats  to the  payments  system 
have  further  extended  this  protection  to  uninsured  depositors  in 
large  failing  institutions.  Overall,  this  deposit  insurance  system 
was  generally  able  to  accomplish  its  objectives  until  the  198Os, 
when  bank  and  thrift  industry  problems  led  to  losses  in  the  bank -3- 
insurance fund and to the substantial deficit and need for taxpayer 
funding  in the thrift  insurance  fund. 
Because  of the nature  of deposit  insurance,  most  recent  and 
proposed efforts to reduce taxpayer liability for deposit insurance 
would  conceivably  sacrifice  some of the stability  in our payments 
system.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  Improvement Act 
of  1991,  for instance,  attempts  to protect  taxpayers  by  limiting 
the  protection  that  uninsured  depositors  in  failing  banks  can 
receive.  Several  other reform ideas would go beyond  this and cut 
back on the existing  levels of deposit  insurance  coverage. 
While the motive  for such changes is understandable,  a number 
of  arguments  suggest  another  approach  is needed.  First,  a safe 
transactions  and clearing  system is more critical  to the nation's 
financial  welfare  than ever before.  The volume  and complexity  of 
financial  transactions  have increased greatly  across the economy, 
and these transactions  rely on the existence of a widely acceptable 
stock of money  and a smoothly  functioning payments  mechanism. 
Also,  the  typical  depositor  is  likely  to  have  a  strong 
preference  and  expectation  of  safety  and  certainty  in  financial 
transactions,  particularly  given  the  payments  system  technology 
available  today  and the level of resources  devoted  to the banking 
system  and  its  regulation.  Most  depositors,  moreover,  hold 
checking  accounts  almost  entirely  for the  services  of making  and 
receiving  payments  and  have  far  less  of  a  concern  over  the 
investment aspects of these accounts.  Consequently,  the likelihood 
of  occasional  disruptions  to  this  transactions  framework  could -4- 
reduce public  confidence  in the financial  system,  keep the level 
of business  activity  from reaching  its full potential,  and divert 
an inordinate  volume  of resources  toward tracking  transactions  or 
using  less efficient  alternatives. 
Another  argument  for  taking  a  different  approach  is  that 
depositor  discipline  and  the  threat  of  loss  for  uninsured 
depositors  may  be  hard  to  enforce.  Many  large  depositors,  for 
instance,  may  have  the  ability  to  react  more  quickly  than  the 
regulatory  authorities  in problem  bank situations.  They may also 
be  able to  find ways to circumvent  any deposit  insurance  changes 
and  thus  avoid  being  exposed  to  losses.  In  addition,  recent 
experience  with large bank failures in the United States has shown 
that depositor discipline will likely raise a number of significant 
concerns.  Major  deposit  disruptions  and  losses,  for  instance, 
could  be  harmful  to  a wide  variety  of  bank  customers,  regional 
economies  and their  credit bases,  and the  reputation  of the U.S. 
banking and payments systems.  These arguments thus imply that many 
proposals  for reform may not only be inconsistent with the need for 
a stable payments  system, but may face many practical  and political 
difficulties  as well. 
Response  to  market  forces 
The need  for a banking  industry that is responsive  to market 
forces has become quite evident with the lending problems that some 
banks have had in recent years.  Banks have been at the forefront 
of  nearly  every  lending  crisis  and  have  been  extremely  slow  in 
working their way out of these problems  and finding more favorable -5- 
alternatives.  Moreover,  deposit  insurance has given weak or high 
risk  lenders  virtually  the  same access  to funds  as the  strongest 
lenders,  thus  diverting  notable  portions  of bank  lending  toward 
less  worthy  ventures  and  away  from  alternatives  more  consistent 
with market  needs. 
The Federal  Deposit  Insurance Corporation  Improvement  Act  of 
1991  takes  a  few  steps  to  encourage  more  market  discipline  and 
limit access to funding by problem institutions.  Overall, however, 
this  legislation  appears  to  give  bank  regulators  greater 
responsibility  for controlling bank risk taking, while leaving less 
of a role  for bankers  and other participants  in the marketplace. 
The act prescribes  exceedingly  detailed  standards  and enforcement 
actions  for  banks,  but  no  matter  how  well  this  framework  is 
conceived,  it will never be a substitute  for market  forces and the 
proper management  of a bank.  In addition,  this  regulation  seems 
likely  to  impose  a  substantial  cost  burden  on  both  problem  and 
sound  banks,  while  turning  much  bank  decision  making  away  from 
bankers  and more into the hands of bank regulators,  examiners,  and 
federal  lawmakers. 
Recent developments thus seem incompatible with increasing  the 
responsiveness  of  the  banking  system  to  market  forces.  Such 
developments,  moreover,  may  tend  to  focus  too  much  supervisory 
intensity  on  past  banking  problems  and  recent  political  and 
regulatory  sentiments,  thus  leaving  banks  vulnerable  to the  next 
crisis -- a crisis that will undoubtedly  generate  a call for even 
more detailed  regulations  and stronger  intervention. -6- 
Future  role  of  banks 
Changes  in the financial marketplace  appear to be occurring 
in  a  direction  counter  to  the  traditional  intermediary  role  of 
commercial  banks.  Over  the  last  decade,  the  availability  of 
financial information  for individual investors and nonbank  lenders 
has increased dramatically.  In addition, substantial declines have 
occurred  in the transaction  costs for making many different  types 
of investments.  These developments  are giving investors a greater 
ability  to bypass traditional  financial  intermediaries  and directly 
place their  funds in the marketplace. 
The same factors are further encouraging  the creation  of new 
financial  instruments  and  an  expansion  in  certain  financial 
markets.  Several examples of this are securitization  of mortgages, 
consumer  loans,  and  other  financial  paper;  introduction  of 
derivative  financial  instruments;  rapid growth  in stock and money 
market  mutual  funds;  and expansion  in commercial  paper  and other 
securities  markets.  In particular,  the  commercial  paper  market 
grew  from  less  than  $125  billion  in  obligations  to  over  $560 
billion  in just a lo-year period.' 
At  the  same  time  these  developments  were  taking  place, 
commercial banks began facing some changes that made them less able 
to compete.  Compared 
the market or through 
to investors placing their funds directly  in 
mutual fund alternatives,  the use of banks as 
'The types  and  variety  of borrowers  using  this  market  have 
also expanded  rapidly.  For more on the growth of this market,  see 
Mitchell  A.  Post,  "The  Evolution  of  the  U.S.  Commercial  Paper 
Market  since  1980," Federal  Reserve  Bulletin  78  (December  1992): 
879-891. -7- 
intermediaries  has  involved  such  additional  costs  as  deposit 
insurance  premiums,  nonearning  reserves,  capital  standards, 
corporate  taxes,  and the burden of regulation.'  In general,  these 
costs  appear  to  be  rising  with  the  higher  insurance  premiums, 
capital standards,  and more extensive regulation brought  on by the 
1991 federal  legislation  and recent industry problems. 
As a result of these changes, banks have been  losing much  of 
their prime corporate  customer base to the commercial paper market 
and other direct sources of credit.  Banks, in fact, have gone from 
once  having  over  90  percent  of  the  short-term  business  credit 
market  to now having  about  60 percent  of this market.3  The added 
costs  of  intermediation  compared  to  direct  investment  are  also 
prompting  banks  to  securitize  and  sell  many  of  their  other  top 
quality  assets. 
This loss of business  is even more notable because banks have 
not  found  many  good  substitutes.  More  and  more,  typical  bank 
borrowers  have become  those  with  a very  limited  access  to direct 
market  funding,  a need  for specialized  types  of financing,  and a 
risk exposure that is difficult  to assess according to usual market 
*The FFIEC's  1993  study  on regulatory  burden  lists previous 
research  as showing that regulatory  costs alone might  represent  6 
to  14 percent  of total  bank  noninterest  expenses,  or a total  of 
between  $7.5  billion  and  $17  billion  for  the  industry  in  1991 
(Federal  Financial  Institutions  Examination  Council,  "Study  on 
Regulatory  Burden,"  January  1993, pages  3 and  4 of the Executive 
Summary). 
3For these  statistics,  as well  as  additional  information  on 
the  role  of  banks  and  changes  in  financial  intermediation,  see 
Gordon H. Sellon,  Jr., "Changes  in Financial  Intermediation:  The 
Role of Pension and Mutual Funds," Economic Review  (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Kansas  City),  Third Quarter  1992, pp. 53-70. -8- 
standards.  This shift in lending thus appears to be leaving banks 
with a less stable asset backing  for deposits  and a more volatile 
risk structure. 
In  addition  to  these  lending  changes,  banks  also  have  had 
difficulty  in  maintaining  their  share  of  the  household  savings 
market.  Pension  funds and mutual  funds -- stock, bond,  and money 
market  -- have been  capturing  a rising portion  of this market  at 
the expense  of bank deposit products.4  Money market  mutual  funds 
gained  rapidly  when  banks  were  constrained  by  deposit  interest 
ceilings  in the  1970s  and early  1980s.  These  and  other  deposit 
alternatives,  though, have continued to grow by offering  investors 
an efficient  and diversified  means of access to financial markets. 
This  broader  choice  of  alternatives  makes  it unlikely  that  bank 
deposits  will  ever  regain  the  importance  they  once  held  in  the 
portfolios  of bank customers. 
The  current  banking  framework  and  recent  reforms  are  thus 
unlikely  to  give  the  public  a  banking  system  that  is  stable, 
responsive  to  market  forces,  and  capable  of  adapting  quickly  to 
ongoing changes  in the financial marketplace.  Nonbank  competition 
and financial  innovation  are taking  away  important  pieces  of the 
banking  business  that  have  previously  provided  much  of  its 
stability.  Many  of the commonly  suggested  banking  reforms  would 
increase  the  level  of  bank  regulation,  thereby  hastening  these 
trends and taking banking further away from the market process.  In 
4For a more detailed presentation  of the changes in household 
savings patterns, see Sellon, "Changes in Financial Intermediation: 
The Role of Pension  and Mutual Funds." -9- 
addition,  ideas  for  reforming  deposit  insurance  would  typically 
place depositors  and payments  system stability  at risk -- all at a 
time when payments  system technology  should be capable of creating 
a more  efficient  and  stable transactions  framework.  This  result 
suggests  that  a different  solution  is needed  --  a  solution  that 
will make the banking  system more flexible and move it back toward 
the market process, but still protect the integrity and confidence 
in our payments  system. 
Narrow  Banking  as  a  Solution  to  the 
Deposit  Insurance  Problem 
Overview  of  narrow  banking 
Narrow  banking  is one measure  that  could be more  compatible 
with monetary  stability,  market  discipline,  and ongoing  financial 
developments.  The term  "narrow banks"  refers to banks that would 
offer deposit accounts and would back these accounts entirely with 
either marketable  securities  of extremely  low risk or currency and 
equivalent  holdings.  Narrow  banks  would  thus  ensure  a  safe 
payments  system  through  the  risk-free  nature  of  their  balance 
sheets.  The  assets  backing  narrow  bank  deposits  would  provide 
ready funds to meet deposit withdrawals  and would make narrow bank 
deposits  the  functional  equivalent  of  currency.  As  a  result, 
depositors  could be  confident about the safety and availability  of 
their deposits,  without putting  taxpayers  or others at risk.5 
5For several  examples  of narrow banking  proposals,  see James 
B.  Burnham,  "Deposit  Insurance:  The Case  for the  Narrow  Bank," 
Requlation  14 (Spring 1991): 35-43;  John H. Kareken,  "Federal Bank Narrow banks  would receive  income from the interest  on their 
securities  and from any fees they charge for transaction  services. 
-  10  - 
This  income  should  enable  them to cover  operating  costs  and make 
interest  payments  on deposits.6  Because  of their  need  for  only 
minimal  amounts  of  capital,  narrow  banks  could  operate  on  low 
margins  and still have a chance to achieve  competitive  returns  on 
equity.  In  addition,  narrow  banks  would  encounter  very  little 
regulatory  burden.  They would only need to make frequent reports 
of  their  assets  and  deposits,  subject  to  a  quick  regulatory 
verification  on occasion. 
Several  different  variations  of  narrow  banking  have  been 
proposed  as  a  means  of  reforming  the  financial  system.  One 
suggestion  is to establish  separate narrow banking  entities  which 
Regulatory  Policy:  A Description  and Some Observations,"  Journal 
of Business  59  (January 1986): 3-48;  Robert E. Litan, What Should 
Banks  Do?  (Washington,  D.C.:  The  Brookings  Institution,  1987); 
James L. Pierce, The Future of Bankinq  (New  Haven:  Yale University 
Press,  1991);  Alex  J. Pollack,  "Collateralized  Money:  An  Idea 
Whose Time Has Come Again," Challenqe,  September/October  1992, pp. 
62-64;  and  James  Tobin,  "The  Case  for  Preserving  Regulatory 
Distinctions,"  in Restructurinq  the Financial  System  (a symposium 
sponsored  by the Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Kansas  City,  1987), pp. 
167-183. 
Many  narrow  banking  concepts,  such  as  safe  banks  and 
minimizing  regulatory  intervention,  can  also  be  traced  back  to 
earlier proposals  for 100 percent reserve banking developed by such 
individuals  as Henry  Simons  (Economic Policy  for  a Free  Society 
(Chicago: University  of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 62-65) and Milton 
Friedman  (A Program  for  Monetary  Stability  (New  York:  Fordham 
University,  1959),  PP.  65-76).  These  proposals  would  have 
restricted  bank  assets to cash and Federal  Reserve  Bank balances, 
thus providing  complete  control over the money  supply. 
6Because of their  limited powers  and liquid  asset  structure, 
narrow  banks  would  primarily  offer  transaction  accounts  and 
services.  Narrow  banks  could  also  be  allowed  to  offer  savings 
accounts, but the terms on such accounts would probably  not differ 
much  from transaction  accounts  in a competitive  marketplace. -  11  - 
would  only  offer  transaction  accounts  and  related  services.  Any 
additional  activities,  such  as traditional  bank  lending,  would  have 
to  be  split  off  into  separate  affiliate  organizations  funded  on  an 
uninsured  basis.  Because  of the  risk-free  nature  of  narrow  banks, 
these  affiliate  activities  would  not  put  narrow  bank  depositors  at 
risk.  As  a consequence,  a broader  range  of  activities  and  a wider 
ownership  structure  might  be  possible  for  affiliates  compared  to 
current  banking  limitations.  In  addition,  affiliate  activities 
could  be  left  to  the  discipline  of  the  uninsured  investors  and 
general  market  forces.  These  affiliates  would  thus  have  the 
freedom  to adapt  to ongoing  financial  developments  and  innovations. 
Other  narrow banking  alternatives  include  "deposited  currency" 
and  "collateralized  or  secured  money."  Banks  or,  in  some  cases, 
the  federal  government  would  have  authority  to  offer  these 
deposits.  This  set  of  alternatives  would  not  require  banks  to  be 
split  into  separate  transaction  and  lending  entities.  Banks  would 
be  required  to  back  their  transaction  accounts  with  liquid,  low- 
risk  securities,  much  as  they  do  now  with  many  public  deposits. 
They  could  continue  to offer  other  financial  services  or a selected 
group  of  such  services,  provided  the  funding  for  these  activities 
was  on  an  uninsured  basis.7 
7Separate  narrow  banks  are  suggested  in  Litan,  What  Should 
Banks  Do?  and  in  Burnham,  "Deposit  Insurance:  The  Case  for  the 
Narrow  Bank."  The  case  for  a deposited  currency  or  collateralized 
money  is  discussed  in  Tobin,  "The  Case  for  Preserving  Regulatory 
Distinctions"  and  in Pollack,  "Collateralized  Money:  An  Idea  Whose 
Time  Has  Come  Again." - 12 - 
A final alternative would be a variation of narrow banking and 
100 percent  reserves.  Under this option, narrow banks  would hold 
their  securities  with  the Federal  Reserve  or would  back  deposits 
with Federal  Reserve accounts representing a proportionate  interest 
in the  System's  portfolio  of securities.  This  alternative  would 
allow regulators  to monitor  directly  a bank's  security  holdings. 
The following analysis will focus primarily on narrow banks as 
separate  banking  entities,  since  this  alternative  provides  the 
clearest  distinction  between  transaction  services  and  other 
financial  activities.  However,  the  other  narrow  banking 
alternatives  would have virtually the same effects with respect to 
reforming  the  financial system and achieving the benefits of narrow 
banking.' 
Comparative  benefits  of  narrow  banking 
Compared  to recent legislation and other proposals  for deposit 
insurance  reform,  narrow  banking  would  offer  two  significant 
benefits.  First,  narrow  banking  would  eliminate  the  fundamental 
problem  in the current banking  system -- deposits  available  at par 
and on demand that are backed with illiquid and risky loans.  This 
traditional  bank  asset/liability  structure  violates  the  basic 
principles  of financial management  by failing to provide  an asset 
'Narrow banking  should,  however,  be  distinguished  from  core 
banking  proposals,  which allow banks to continue  most traditional 
lending activities but with restrictions  on the size of individual 
loans and on deposit interest rates  (see Lowell L. Bryan, Breakinq 
Up the Bank  (Homewood, IL:  Business One Irwin, 1988).  While core 
banks might be of some benefit  in limiting bank  risk taking,  they 
would  still  not  lead  to  the  type  of  nearly  risk-free  deposits 
characteristic  of narrow banking  proposals. - 13 - 
base with sufficient liquidity and security to support withdrawable 
deposits.g 
Because  of this structure,  the survival  and stability  of the 
banking  system depends on an extensive governmental  support system 
-- a system that  seems to expand  over time in response  to banking 
crises,  financial  innovation,  and  the  development  of  new  bank 
assets  and  off-balance-sheet  activities.  Major  elements  in this 
safety net now include:  (1) deposit  insurance  to give depositors 
confidence,  (2) discount  window  lending  to  compensate  for  the 
illiquid  assets  at  banks,  and  (3)  detailed  regulation  and 
supervision  to  control  bank  activities  and  risk  taking.  Narrow 
banking would correct this unstable structure by requiring banks to 
match their deposits with assets that are liquid and of inherently 
low  risk.  Consequently,  depositors  could  look  directly  to  the 
narrow bank  for safety and would no longer have any real need  for 
'For a more  detailed  discussion  of this  issue,  see  John  H. 
Kareken,  "Ensuring  Financial  Stability,"  in  The  Search  for 
Financial  Stabilitv:  The Past Fifty Years  (a  conference  sponsored 
by the Federal  Reserve  Bank of San Francisco,  1985), pp. 53-77. 
The unstable  nature  of the current banking  structure  and its 
divergence  from  market  principles  is  obvious  in  other  ways. 
Financial  institutions  that  operate  without  a federal  safety  net 
have been  forced by the market  to adopt  a much  different  balance 
sheet structure than banks.  Uninsured  lenders, for instance, must 
typically maintain  longer term and more stable funding and somewhat 
higher capital standards.  Similarly, those institutions that offer 
investment  accounts  with  transaction  privileges,  such  as  money 
market mutual funds, generally confine their asset holdings to low- 
risk, short-term  marketable  securities. - 14 - 
deposit  insurance  and  a  complex  system  of  governmental 
protection.lO 
A  second  and  related  benefit  of  narrow  banking  is  that  it 
could  eliminate  much  of  the  need  for  extensive  governmental 
involvement  in  bank  lending  and  other  policy  decisions.  The 
present  banking  system  is  a  classic  case  of  where  governmental 
oversight has expanded from an important public policy objective -- 
protection  of  depositors  with  transaction  accounts  and  thus  the 
payments  system  --  to  less  appropriate  objectives  --  review  of 
private  lending decisions  and intervention  in managerial  and bank 
policymaking  functions. 
This credit and managerial oversight by public authorities can 
add its own distortions  to the  financial  system  and divert  funds 
away  from normal  market  channels.  Deposit  insurance  contributes 
further  distortions  to the credit  granting  process  by  giving  the 
weakest  bank  lenders  the  same  access  to  funds  as the  strongest. 
While  the  $200  billion  cost  of  the  thrift  bailout,  along  with 
recent  losses  in the bank  insurance  fund, provide  some indication 
of the magnitude  these distortions  can assume, the total losses to 
the  economy  have  undoubtedly  been  several  times  larger.  These 
"For  this  level  of  safety  to be  realized,  narrow  banks  and 
their  customers  would  not  only  have  to  refrain  from  credit 
transactions,  but would also have to be limited in their ability to 
overdraw  any  of their  accounts  during  the business  day  and  over 
longer periods.  For a narrow bank, daylight overdrafts  would pose 
a risk to customers and the payments system whenever the overdrafts 
could  exhaust  bank  capital.  In many  ways,  these  payments  system 
issues  are  similar  to  those  that  currently  exist  in the  banking 
system  and  might  require  many  of  the  same  steps  toward  reform. 
However,  the  low  capital  requirements  of narrow  banks  and  their 
"fail safe" nature could make these reform steps even more urgent. -  15  - 
additional  losses arise from the fact that the capital  and assets 
of poorly  managed  banks  and thrifts  might  have  been  directed  by 
market  forces  into other pursuits  yielding much higher  returns  to 
the overall  economy.11 
Narrow  banking  could  eliminate  much  of  this  need  for 
governmental  intervention  into bank lending and policy  decisions. 
Lending  and  other  risk  taking  functions  would  be  shifted  into 
uninsured  affiliates  where  they  would  have  no  influence  on 
depositor  safety.  Furthermore,  affiliate  activities  could  be 
subject to market  discipline,  which should provide  more direction 
in  channeling  funds  to  the  better  lenders,  curtailing  funding 
access  for others,  and allowing banking  organizations  to adapt to 
market  changes. 
Questions  That  Might  Be  Raised  By  Narrow  Banking 
Narrow  banking  would  require  a significant  restructuring  of 
our  financial  system.  Bank  insured  deposit  and  transaction 
activities would no longer be tied directly with credit activities, 
thus  changing  many  customer  relationships.  The  roles  of  many 
financial  institutions  would  also  change  with  the development  of 
new lenders  and the removal  of competitive  barriers  between  banks 
'IIn  reference  to the  federal  outlays  for recapitalizing  the 
bank and thrift insurance funds, Benjamin Friedman stated, "In this 
era  of  shrunken  capital  formation,  [these  outlays  are] 
approximately  equal to three entire years' worth of net additions 
to our  stock  of productive  plant  and equipment"  ("The Nature  and 
Necessity  of Financial Reform," a public policy forum of The Jerome 
Levy Economics  Institute  of Bard College, April  6,  1991,  p. 7). and  other  financial 
system  consequently 
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firms.  This  transformation  of  the  financial 
raises  many  specific  questions,  which  must 
first  be  addressed  before  the  overall  benefits,  weaknesses,  and 
implementation  concerns  of  narrow  banking  can  be  judged. 
Are  there  sufficient  low  risk  assets  available  to  support  a 
narrow  bank  concept?  The  feasibility  of narrow  banking  will  depend 
on whether  organizations  can  obtain  enough  low  risk  assets,  such  as 
short-term  U.S.  Government  securities,  to  back  their  deposits. 
This  might  appear  to  be  a rather  dramatic  leap  for  many  banks,  but 
somewhat  surprisingly,  perhaps,  recent  balance  sheet  information 
indicates  that  many  organizations  could  reasonably  make  the 
transition. 
To  accomplish  this,  banking  organizations  must  either  already 
hold  enough  appropriate  assets  or be  able  to  obtain  any  additional 
assets  needed.  In  this  regard,  U.S.  commercial  banks  had  $888 
billion  in domestic  holdings  of cash,  reserves,  balances  with  other 
institutions,  and  securities  at  mid-year  1992.  This  compared  to 
domestic  transaction  deposits  of  $710  billion.  In  general,  these 
numbers  indicate  that  many  banks  may  already  have  a  good  start 
toward  constructing  the  type  of  asset  base  needed  for  a  narrow 
banking  system.l* 
Several  changes,  though,  might  be  necessary  in the  securities 
held  by  banks.  Since  many  of  these  securities  now  consist  of 
notes,  bonds,  and  mortgage-related  debt  with  maturities  of  several 
12For greater  detail  on the  current  structure  of U.S.  banks  and 
the  type  of  balance  sheet  changes  that  would  be  required  under  a 
narrow  banking  system,  please  see  the  Appendix  to  this  paper. - 17 - 
years  or  longer,  a  shift  toward  shorter  maturities  would  be 
necessary  to minimize  any interest rate exposure  for narrow banks. 
Also,  a  few  of  the  securities  held  by  banks  may  not  have  the 
marketability  or nearly riskless credit characteristics  that would 
be desirable  for narrow  bank  assets.  Another  limitation  is that 
not  all  of  the  cash  assets  and  securities  should  be  viewed  as 
freely available  for supporting  narrow bank deposits.  Some might 
be  used  to  support  the  operations  of uninsured  affiliates  or to 
cover  deposit  runoffs  and  affiliate  funding  shortfalls  in  the 
transition  to narrow banking. 
Even with these qualifications,  narrow banks and their parent 
organizations  could conceivably make the necessary adjustments with 
only  moderate  changes  in  their  operations  and  in  securities 
markets.13  Although  short-term  federal debt -- the most plausible 
asset for narrow banks -- barely exceeds the current volume of bank 
transaction  accounts,  the U.S.  Treasury  would  seemingly  have  the 
flexibility  to supply additional  amounts.  This could include more 
short-term  debt  issuance  or  somewhat  longer  term  debt  with  a 
variable  rate  structure.  Moreover,  as narrow  banks  added  to the 
demand for such instruments  and banks sought to sell some of their 
longer term securities, market conditions would provide support for 
13For a  similar  type  of  analysis,  see  Burnham,  "Deposit 
Insurance:  The Case  for the Narrow  Bank,"  pp.  41,42;  and Litan, 
What  Should Banks Do?, pp.169-173. - 18 - 
this  shift  in  U.S.  Treasury  funding.14  A  transition  period  for 
narrow banking  could further ease any market  adjustments. 
Another possible  alternative would be to expand narrow banking 
assets to include a somewhat broader  range of federal,  state, and 
local government  securities and short-term, highly rated corporate 
obligations."  Taken together,  these  instruments  could  amount  to 
as much as $5 trillion,  although narrow bank restrictions  on asset 
maturity  and  marketability  would  result  in  a  smaller  volume  of 
"appropriate"  securities.  There  are  also  other  possibilities, 
including  derivative  investment  products  structured  to have  some 
payment  streams  of shorter maturity  and very  little  credit  risk. 
Several  of  these  alternative  investments,  however,  could  leave 
narrow  banks  with  a  limited  exposure  to  interest  rate  or  credit 
risks -- risks that would have to be controlled  by higher  capital 
standards,  closer monitoring  of assets, diversification  across the 
assets,  and efforts by debt issuers to create  safer securities. 
What  would  happen  to  credit  availability?  Narrow  banking 
would  redirect  the  existing  credit  functions  of  depository 
institutions  toward  bank  credit  affiliates  and  other  market 
lenders.  To  a  significant  extent,  a  shift  toward  other  market 
lenders is already occurring and seems likely to continue, based on 
14Because  the total volume of federal debt in private hands is 
now approaching  $3 trillion,  the U.S. Treasury  would have a large 
base  for starting to make these maturity  changes. 
15A  broader  range of securities, particularly  with respect to 
private  sector  issuers,  would  help to limit  any added preference 
that narrow banking would give to U.S. Government  securities in the 
marketplace.  Unless the list of acceptable securities were greatly 
expanded,  though,  the market  effects would  likely be marginal. -  19 - 
the  added  costs  banks  face  as  regulated  intermediaries.  Narrow 
bank  lending  affiliates  could  give  banking  organizations  the 
opportunity  to  avoid  some  of  these  costs  and  restructure  their 
lending operations  under a more efficient  and flexible  framework. 
At the same time, though, narrow bank affiliates would have to find 
sufficient  uninsured  funding  before  they 
lending  roles now performed  by the banking 
could  take  over  the 
system. 
To attract funding, narrow bank affiliates would have to meet 
the  same  market  standards  as  other  lenders  for  capitalization, 
asset quality,  and other relevant performance  measures.  With the 
low risk  inherent  in narrow banks,  much  of the equity  now  in the 
banking system could be directed  toward  credit affiliates, provided 
bank stockholders were willing to make this change.  If this equity 
were to be shifted and the lending affiliates  were to assume most 
bank  lending  operations,  the affiliates  as a group would be near, 
but still somewhat below,  the equity ratios of comparable  finance 
companies  or short-term  business  lenders.16 
Consequently,  lending affiliates would need  to take some steps 
to raise additional  capital, reduce loan portfolios,  or achieve an 
asset  quality  higher  than  other  lenders.  In many  cases,  these 
16The Appendix  to  this  paper  provides  a  more  detailed 
comparison  of  the  lending  affiliates  of  narrow  banks  and  other 
types of lenders. 
On  a more  limited  basis,  many banking  organizations  already 
have experience  managing  uninsured  lending affiliates  through  the 
bank holding  company  structure.  This experience  includes holding 
company  subsidiaries  operating  as finance, mortgage,  leasing,  and 
factoring  companies.  As  uninsured  lenders,  these  companies 
typically  must meet the usual market  standards. -  20  - 
pressures  are similar to what banks are already beginning  to face 
under  risk-based  capital  standards  and  1991 banking  legislation. 
A more flexible lending framework could help narrow bank affiliates 
attract  additional  capital,  and  the  affiliates  could  also  use 
securitization  and  asset  sales  or  placements  to  reduce  overall 
capital needs. 
Other  related  considerations  include  whether  lending  by 
smaller banking  organizations  would be restricted  due to a limited 
access  to  market  funding  and  whether  affiliate  lenders  would  be 
willing  to take  on the many  different  types  of  loans  offered  by 
banks.  Smaller  organizations  would presumably  lack direct  access 
to major credit markets and thus would have to obtain much of their 
funding  from  local  investors,  other  lenders,  bank  customers  that 
previously  held  time  and  savings  deposits,  and  any  new  funding 
sources that might develop.  While these sources could conceivably 
meet  most  needs,  any  shortfalls  might  require  a  small  bank 
exemption  from narrow  banking  or a lengthy transition  period  for 
these  organizations.l' 
The type of lending by affiliates  could differ in a number of 
ways  from  that  of  banks  because  of  differences  in  funding  and 
market pressures.  Although  banks  seem destined  to change part of 
their lending focus, they have traditionally been viewed as filling 
a number  of borrowing  needs  not met by other market  participants 
and serving  as a back-up  source  of liquidity  for many  borrowers. 
17A small  bank  exemption  is  discussed  in  Burnham,  "Deposit 
Insurance:  The Case  for the Narrow  Bank,"  p.  38;  and  in Litan, 
What  Should Banks Do?, p. 182. -  21  - 
Market pressures  might limit the ability of narrow bank affiliates 
to fill these  roles.  However,  a strong demand  for such  services 
would  presumably  entice  some  affiliates  or  other  lenders  to 
maintain  the  capital  backing  and funding base  necessary  to  serve 
different  customers  and  provide  various  forms  of  credit 
enhancements. 
A final factor that should lessen credit concerns under narrow 
banking  is the decline  in any advantages  banks  may have  once had 
over other lenders.  In recent years, the credit-granting  abilities 
of nonbank  lenders have increased substantially  with the growth of 
securitization,  commercial  paper,  and other securities instruments. 
In  fact,  nonbank  sources  now  represent  the  predominant  force  in 
most parts of the credit market,  and this seems likely to continue 
in step with improvements  in financial disclosure and the amount of 
credit reporting  available  to investors  and nonbank  lenders." 
As  a  result,  nonbank  lenders,  investors,  and  narrow  bank 
affiliates would seem to be capable of fulfilling most, if not all, 
of the general  credit needs of the economy.  In a number of areas, 
funding could even be expected to improve if narrow bank affiliates 
were given the freedom to participate  more extensively  in debt and 
equity markets.  In particular,  with increased market  discipline, 
the  better  lenders  and  the  more  creditworthy  customers  could 
'*The  information that bank lenders presently gain from knowing 
a  customer's  deposit  history  need  not  be  lost  under  a  narrow 
banking  system.  Narrow  banks,  for  instance,  would  be  free  to 
disclose  such information  to their lending affiliates  or to other 
lenders. - 22 - 
actually  be  expected  to  gain  better  access  to  funding  under  a 
narrow banking  framework. 
Would  narrow  banks  be  competitive  with  other  financial  firms? 
The competitiveness  of narrow banks is important  if they are to be 
a lasting part  of the financial  system and discourage  other  firms 
from  developing  new  transaction  or  deposit  substitutes.  From  a 
financial  perspective,  narrow  banks,  if free of major  regulatory 
burdens,  should  be  able  to  offer  their  depositors  a  return 
competitive  with  other  low-risk  investment  alternatives.lg  Most 
of the potential  competitors  for narrow banks, such as money market 
mutual  funds and cash management  accounts,  are structured  in much 
the  same manner  as narrow  banks  and would thus have  few,  if any, 
natural competitive advantages.  Moreover, since narrow banks would 
be  free  to  offer  a  complete  range  of  payments  services  to  the 
banking  public,  they might even have a competitive  advantage  over 
these  other  institutions.20  Some  of these  competitors,  in  fact, 
could  be  expected  to  convert  into narrow  banks  in order  to  gain 
access to the payments  system. 
From a stockholder's  standpoint,  efficiently  operated  narrow 
banks  should also be competitive  with other investments.  Because 
lgFor narrow  banks  to  be  free  of  major  regulatory  burdens, 
their  capital  requirements  and degree of regulation  would have to 
fully  reflect  their  low  level  of  risk  and  they  would  have  to 
receive a competitive  return on any reserves they were required to 
hold. 
20Although many  of  the  banking  organizations  establishing 
narrow  banks  might  maintain  more  of an office  structure  and have 
higher  fixed  costs  than  money  market  funds  or  other  potential 
competitors,  the  added  expenditures,  if wisely  invested,  should 
help attract  customers  or generate more  fees. - 23 - 
narrow  banks  would  need  only  limited  amounts  of capital  to cover 
fixed assets and protect against fraud and other risks, they could 
operate with  low margins  and still achieve competitive  returns  on 
equity.  Possible  synergies  between  the  transaction  services  at 
narrow  banks  and  other  financial  products  offered  by  affiliate 
companies  would  further  increase  the  investment  value  of narrow 
banks. 
A  final  competitive  question  is  how  narrow  banking  would 
compare  with  the  current  banking  system.  While  some  banking 
analysts  have  argued  that  narrow  banking  would  suffer  in 
comparison, this reform could conceivably offer several significant 
advantages.*l  Narrow  banking  would  finally  recognize  checking 
accounts  for what they actually are -- a service in which balances 
are  maintained  to  provide  the  liquidity  necessary  to  carry  out 
transactions.  In addition, this reform would put all other banking 
functions  into  a  separate  and  more  flexible  format,  thus 
eliminating  many  of the restrictions  and regulatory  burdens  banks 
currently face.  Recent evidence further indicates that  traditional 
lending  activities  at many banks  have not been  highly  profitable 
and,  in  some  cases,  have  not  even  kept  up  with  bank  investment 
portfolio  yields  when  overhead  expenses  and  credit  losses  are 
*IFor articles  discussing  the  advantages  of  the  existing 
banking  structure,  see Randall  J. Pozdena,  "The False Hope of the 
Narrow  Bank,"  FRBSF  Weekly  Letter  (Federal Reserve  Bank  of  San 
Francisco,  November  8, 1991); and Bert Ely,  "The Narrow  Bank:  A 
Flawed  Response  to  the  Failings  of  Federal  Deposit  Insurance," 
Regulation  14  (Spring 1991): 44-52. -  24  - 
considered.**  Narrow  banks  would  also  have  an  advantage  in 
offering  their  depositors  complete  safety  in  contrast  to  recent 
legislative  provisions  which  seek  to put  uninsured  bank  depositors 
at  greater  risk. 
A  final  competitive  consideration  is  that  narrow  banking  may 
be  more  consistent  with  recent  and  future  trends  in  the  financial 
system.  Electronic  banking,  automated  payments,  and  declining 
transaction  costs  are  putting  added  emphasis  on  safety  and 
liquidity  in  the  payments  system.  With  their  entire  focus  on 
transaction  accounts  and  services,  narrow  banks  might  represent  the 
best  structure  for  developing  a more  efficient  and  stable  payments 
system.  The  ongoing  shift  toward  direct  investment  and  nonbank 
savings  products  can  also  be  expected  to  leave  banks  with  a 
declining  role  as  a  financial  intermediary,  and  the  narrow  bank 
affiliate  format  would  likely  provide  more  flexibility  in adjusting 
to  this  environment. 
What  would  happen  to  financial  and credit market  stability? 
Under  the  present  framework,  banks  are  viewed  as  a  source  of 
liquidity  during  financial  crises  and  as  a  support  to  credit 
markets.  This  liquidity  and  support  comes  from  the  protection 
banks  receive  under  the  federal  safety  net,  their  access  to  the 
**For  a  comparison  of  the  net  earnings  on  bank  lending  and 
investment  activities,  see  Bruce  W.  Morgan,  "Financial  Services 
after  the  Decline  of  Deposit  Banking,"  Bankinq  Policy  Report  10 
(October  21,  1991):  1,  12-15.  For  additional  information  on  the 
net  returns  to  various  banking  activities,  see  Functional  Cost 
Analysis,  National  Averaqe  Report  -  Commercial  Banks,  Federal 
Reserve  System. -  25  - 
discount  window,  and  the  various  commitments,  guarantees,  and 
contingent  obligations  of banks that back up the financial  system. 
With a narrow banking system, there has been some concern that 
key  elements  of  this  support  would  be  lost  to  the  detriment  of 
financial  stability.  A related concern has been that narrow bank 
lending  affiliates  would not be immune from the types  of problems 
that  have  been  inherent  in  the  traditional  banking  system, 
including depositor panics, liquidity squeezes, and difficulties  in 
resolving  failing  institutions.  According  to those  holding  such 
concerns, much of the existing regulatory framework would just have 
to  be  reestablished  for narrow  banks  and  their  affiliates,  thus 
eliminating  any potential  benefits. 
A number of sound arguments suggest  that  these concerns either 
are  not  likely  to  be  realized  or  can  be  prevented  with  a  much 
simpler safety net.  First, narrow banking would provide the means 
to create  an extremely  stable payments  system, thus correcting  an 
important historical  source of instability  in the U.S. economy and 
in the credit  system. 
Another  important piece of evidence is that the vast majority 
of credit  transactions  already  take place  outside  of the banking 
industry,  leaving  credit  stability  largely  dependent  upon  these 
other, less regulated markets.  These same markets, moreover,  have 
shown  a high  level  of stability  in past  years  while  dealing  with 
economic  fluctuations  and credit problems.23  In a number  of ways, 
23An important  factor  in this  record  is that  credit  markets 
have grown to where they now serve a wide variety of borrowers  and 
investors,  thus providing  many opportunities  for diversification, -  26  - 
this  record  stands  in  contrast  to  the  problems  that  have  been 
encountered  in  thrifts  and  banks,  which  have  been  under  close 
regulation  and the protection  of the federal  safety net. 
Narrow  bank  lending  affiliates  would  be  subject  to the  same 
type  of  forces  that  have  helped  stabilize  the  private  credit 
markets.  For  instance,  lending  affiliates  of narrow  banks  would 
typically  need  strong  capital  backing  and  a  longer  term  debt 
structure  in  order  to  attract  and  retain  uninsured  investors. 
These  changes  could  conceivably  lead  to  a  sounder  financial 
structure  for  lenders,  to  more  stable  and  conservative  lending 
policies,  and to  investors  more  capable  of  judging  risk exposure 
and providing  a disciplinary  influence.  Public disclosures  would 
further  serve to reinforce  these policies. 
Market  forces,  in  fact,  would  give  narrow  bank  credit 
affiliates  and their  stockholders  and creditors  strong  incentives 
to curtail  funding of speculative  activities.  Investors  that are 
fully at risk would be far less likely to fund questionable  loans 
than in the case of bank depositors,  who have insurance protection 
and a much  shorter  term  focus.  These  same  incentives  would  help 
credit  affiliates  resolve  in a more  orderly  and efficient  manner 
any  problems  that  might  arise.  One  indication  of  how  credit 
problems might be resolved can be found in recent investor workouts 
associated  with  corporate  takeovers  and  "junk"  bond  financing. 
These workouts,  in nearly  every  case, have proceeded  without  the 
same crisis  atmosphere  and inefficiency  associated  with the S & L 
additional  liquidity,  and products  for specialized  needs. - 27 - 
collapse and subsequent RTC operations.  Although painful  for some 
investors,  these  private  resolutions  have  engendered  their  own 
corrective  forces,  free of governmental  intervention  and taxpayer 
exposure. 
Since credit markets  would continue to fluctuate  in response 
to the economy  and a variety  of other  factors,  a final  source  of 
credit stability could continue to be the Federal Reserve discount 
window.  Under  narrow  banking,  this  "lender  of  last  resort" 
function  could  no  longer be provided  through  traditional  banking 
channels.  However,  the  Federal  Reserve  could  provide  liquidity 
directly  to  credit  affiliates  and other uninsured  lenders  in the 
event  of  a  systemic  credit  collapse.  Although  such  temporary 
assistance might pose a variety of administrative  issues, it would 
keep the  discount  window  consistent  with  its original  purpose  of 
maintaining  a stable economy.24 
Bow  would  monetary  policy  be  affected  by  narrow  banking? 
Narrow banking raises many monetary policy questions with regard  to 
open market  operations,  reserve  requirements,  and discount  window 
credit.  In  addition,  it  could  influence  the  structure  and 
relationship of the monetary aggregates, the behavior of the short- 
term  securities  market,  and the manner  in which  money  is created 
and expanded. 
240n  an operational  level, discount window  lending might  also 
be needed if narrow banks maintained  required reserves or clearing 
balances  with  the  Federal  Reserve  and  had  to  replenish  these 
accounts  after large, end-of-day  clearing  activities. -  28  - 
These monetary policy questions involve a variety of technical 
issues that have yet to be considered  in a thorough  fashion.  Some 
questions,  such  as  the  need  for  reserve  requirements  and  the 
relationship  of the monetary  aggregates,  involve  a number  of the 
same  issues  and  problems  posed  by  the  current  banking  system. 
Other  aspects  of  narrow  banking,  including  its  effect  on  the 
securities  market  and  on money  and  credit  expansion,  may  entail 
several new considerations.  While narrow banking  does not appear 
to have any obvious drawbacks with regard to monetary policy, many 
of  its  policy  effects  will  need  to  be  analyzed  more  carefully 
before  implementation. 
What  international  banking  issues  would  arise  with  narrow 
banking?  If the United  States were to adopt narrow banking  on its 
own, a number  of issues could arise concerning  foreign entry  into 
the United  States and expansion  abroad by domestic  organizations. 
Foreign banks entering this country would need to establish  narrow 
banks  and  carry  out  other  activities  here  through  uninsured 
affiliates.  This  would  thus  give  them  the  same  powers  as  U.S. 
banks  and  would  allow  them  to  continue  or  even  expand  their 
existing  operations  through  the  use  of  affiliates.  For  U.S. 
banking  organizations  with narrow banks,  foreign activities  would 
have to be conducted through foreign-chartered  banks or affiliates 
isolated  from the narrow bank. 
Since  much  of  U.S.  banking  expansion  abroad  is  through 
branches,  the  United  States  may  need  to  create  special 
international  banking  charters,  much  like  that  of  Edge -  29  - 
Corporations,  and allow these "banks" to establish branches abroad. 
Such banks would be separate from narrow banks, thus allowing U.S. 
organizations  to  branch  and  conduct  international  operations 
without  compromising  the safety of narrow bank depositors.  While 
foreign  banking  activities  would  be  subject  to  the  regulatory 
restrictions  of the  foreign  country,  U.S.  authorities  might  also 
have a limited oversight role in order to protect the reputation of 
the U.S. banking  system. 
Summary 
Recent banking  problems  have prompted  a variety  of proposals 
for reforming deposit insurance and  the  banking system.  Nearly all 
of  these  proposals,  however,  suffer  from  a  common  flaw  --  they 
would fail to create a banking  system that is both stable and free 
to respond to market  forces and financial developments. 
Narrow banking offers a possible means for accomplishing  these 
objectives.  Narrow banking  would create a stable payments  system 
by  backing  transaction  deposits  with  only  those  assets  that  are 
truly  appropriate  for  this  task  --  marketable  securities  with 
virtually  no  interest  rate  or credit  risk.  As  a result,  narrow 
banks  would  essentially  be  "fail-safe"  institutions  and  could 
operate  without  the  inherent  weaknesses  of  the  current  system. 
They  would  not  pose  a risk  to  depositors,  taxpayers,  or  federal 
authorities  and,  unlike  commercial  banks,  would  not  require 
extensive governmental  support and intervention.  These features of - 30 - 
narrow  banks  would  allow market  forces to guide  everyday  banking 
decisions  and  the  activities  of  any  affiliated  firms,  thus 
returning  the  market  to  its proper  role  in allocating  financial 
services. 
In  many  respects,  narrow  banking  mirrors  another  banking 
reform that took place  in the 1860s -- the use of U.S. Government 
securities  to back  national  bank notes.  This earlier  reform  and 
the  following  change  to  Federal  Reserve  Notes  collateralized 
largely  by  U.S.  obligations  have  produced  a  stable  currency  and 
ended  any public  concern  about  its  acceptability.  This  success 
provides  strong evidence  that narrow banking  is a workable  system 
that  could  stabilize  our  deposit  system  and  its  transactions 
function. 
Narrow  banking,  much  like  this  earlier  reform,  appears  to 
involve  a dramatic  change in the banking  system.  However,  recent 
financial  trends  are making  narrow  banking  a less radical  change 
than commonly believed.  In addition, most of the other approaches 
to  recent  banking  problems  entail  a  movement  toward  greater 
regulatory and governmental  control of our financial system and its 
credit allocation  functions -- a response that is unlikely to make 
banking a vibrant, competitive  industry.  All of these factors thus 
suggest  that  narrow  banking  deserves  careful  consideration  in 
efforts  to reform the financial  system. APPENDIX - 32 - 
Possible  Bank Industry Balance  Sheet Changes 
in Shifting to a  Narrow Banking  System 
To establish narrow banks, banking organizations  in the United 
States  would  have  to  divide  their  banks  into  several  separate 
entities.  A narrow bank would take over the transaction  accounts 
and much of the liquid assets and securities  from its traditional 
bank predecessor.  A credit affiliate  would assume  responsibility 
for  the  bank's  loan  portfolio  and  would  obtain  funding  on  an 
uninsured basis from market sources.  In addition, an international 
banking  entity  might  be  needed  to  continue  the  activities  that 
major U.S. banks now conduct through  foreign branches. 
A number of changes in these activities could be expected once 
banking  organizations  converted  to narrow banking.  For instance, 
some  shifts  in transactions  accounts  might  occur  as narrow  banks 
establish  rates on deposits and compete with each other to provide 
the most efficient  services.  Also,  as they begin  to face greater 
market  discipline,  credit  affiliates  may  pursue  a  different 
direction  in choosing  to  hold,  sell,  or  securitize  loans.  In a 
similar fashion, organizations may alter their lending functions if 
they  receive  authority  to  provide  a  broader  range  of  debt  and 
equity financing.  For simplicity, however, the following analysis 
will look at the banking industry as it is structured today and how 
bank  assets,  liabilities,  and capital  might  be  apportioned  among 
narrow banks,  credit affiliates,  and international  banks. - 33 - 
This analysis  looks at the entire banking  industry  and the 
aggregate  changes  that  would  be  involved  in  shifting  to  narrow 
banking.  For individual banks, the ease in making this transition 
will  depend  on their  current balance  sheet  structure  and overall 
condition  relative  to  that  of  the  typical  bank.  While  these 
individual  bank  considerations  would be important  in implementing 
narrow banking, no attempt will be made here to examine the effects 
on certain banks  or particular  groups of banks. 
In the following analysis, all domestic transaction  accounts, 
cash  assets,  and  reserves  held  by  U.S.  banks  are  assumed  to  be 
passed  on to the  narrow  banks,  along with  a sufficient  level  of 
securities  to  back  deposits  and  enough  capital  to  create  a  two 
percent  capital-to-asset  ratio.25  The credit affiliates  of narrow 
banks would receive any remaining, domestically held securities and 
all  of the  domestic  loans  and  other  assets  now  held  by  banks.26 
These credit affiliates would then attempt to replace the deposits 
and other liabilities supporting bank loans with various sources of 
market funding.  International banking  affiliates would hold all of 
the  foreign  assets  and  foreign  deposits.  Credit  affiliates  and 
international  banking entities are assumed to divide the remaining 
25This  capital level is based primarily  on the need to finance 
the facilities  and fixed assets that narrow banks might require in 
their  operations.  From  a  supervisory  standpoint,  narrow  banks 
would only need to maintain enough capital to discourage  fraudulent 
activities  and to cover any minimal  levels of risk in their  asset 
portfolios. 
26Credit affiliates  would  also need to hold  some cash  assets 
in order  to  conduct  their  operations.  However,  for most  credit 
affiliates, these assets would only need to be of a marginal amount 
based  on the typical  holdings  of most nonbank  lenders today. -  34  - 
bank  equity  base  evenly  in  proportion  to  their  adjusted  asset 
holdings. 
Table 1 reflects the banking assets, liabilities,  and capital 
held by all U.S. banks at mid-year  1992.  The hypothetical  balance 
sheets in Table 2 reflect what these organizations  would look like 
as a combined  group  if all the above  steps toward  narrow  banking 
were  to  take  place.  Because  these  steps  reflect  simplified 
assumptions,  Table 2 should be viewed primarily  as a general guide 
to the  types  of adjustments  that might  occur  in a transition  to 
narrow banking. 
The  balance  sheets  indicate  that  three  factors  would  be 
important  in implementing  narrow  banking.  First,  if banks  could 
retain  much  of  their  liquid  assets  and  securities,  they  would 
already  have much  of the backing  they would  need  for transaction 
accounts  under  a narrow  banking  system.  A  shift  toward  shorter 
term securities would likely be necessary, but banks would not need 
a major  expansion  in their  securities portfolio.27 
Second,  the  credit  affiliates  would  have  to  obtain  a  vast 
amount  of  uninsured  funding  from  market  sources.  Some  of  this 
funding could come directly from the customers that previously held 
CDs and other savings instruments at commercial banks.  The funding 
could also come indirectly from these depositors as they move their 
money  into  commercial  paper,  mutual  funds,  and other  alternative 
27The  level of securities held by banks has increased over the 
last few years  in response to declines  in loan demand  and changes 
in regulatory policy.  Securities holdings  in prior years, though, 
would have also provided much or all of the deposit backing  needed 
for narrow banks. - 35 - 
instruments.  Credit affiliates would also have the opportunity  to 
develop  new  types  of debt  and equity  offerings.  Overall,  a key 
factor  in these  financing  efforts  would be the  ability  of credit 
affiliates  to  meet  the  same  market  standards  as  other  private 
lenders. 
Finally,  to meet market  standards  and secure funding,  credit 
affiliates  would have to maintain  an equity base  similar to other 
lenders.  The figures in Table 2 indicate that the existing capital 
in banks  would  give  credit  affiliates  an equity  capital-to-asset 
ratio  of  nearly  8.7  percent.  This  assumes  that  current  bank 
stockholders  would  be  content  to  invest  in  credit  affiliates  in 
much the same manner as they were with commercial  banks.  If these 
affiliates  concentrated  on lending and did not retain many of the 
other assets now held by banks, this equity ratio could rise to as 
much as 10 percent.  In comparison,  domestic  finance companies  and 
short-term  business  credit  companies  have  maintained  average 
capital  ratios  between  8.5  and  13.7  percent,  depending  on  the 
definition  of  capital,  the  time  period,  the  types  of  companies 
included,  and  the  degree  of  perceived  parent  company  support." 
At year-end  1990, for instance, the ten largest  finance companies 
"For more information on the capital ratios of other lenders, 
see Federal  Reserve  Bulletin  78  (November  1992),  Table  1.51,  p. 
A34;  "Recent  Trends  in  Commercial  Bank  Profitability:  A  Staff 
Study,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  (19861,  P.  278; 
"Modernizing  the  Financial  System,"  Department  of  the  Treasury, 
February  1991, pp. 12-13; American Banker, December  11, 1991, p.8; 
and  "Finance  Companies,  Bank  Competition,  and  Niche  Markets," 
Quarterlv  Review  (Federal Reserve Bank of New York),  Summer  1992, 
p.36. -  36  - 
not affiliated  with banks had equity capital equal to 10.7 percent 
of assets.2g 
These capital  ratios imply that a simple division  of present 
banking  industry portfolios  between  narrow banks  and their  credit 
affiliates  could leave the affiliates  with capital  ratios  several 
percentage points below that of comparable lenders.  To narrow this 
gap,  credit  affiliates  would  need  to  raise  additional  capital, 
reduce  their  holdings  of  loans  and  other  assets,  or  achieve  an 
asset quality  higher than other lenders. 
In summary, present bank balance sheet figures do not indicate 
any insurmountable  difficulties  in moving toward  a narrow banking 
system.  The banking industry would appear to be capable of finding 
an asset  base  to  support  narrow  bank  deposits.  Some  additional 
capital  and new funding  sources could be needed to finance  credit 
affiliates.  However,  similar changes are likely to occur with or 
without  narrow banking  as banks  face tighter  capital  requirements 
and  as  investors  and  savers  continue  to  make  greater  use  of  a 
variety  of  market  investment  instruments.  The  narrow  banking 
format could, in fact, give banking organizations  more flexibility 
in making  these  adjustments. 
"The  ten  largest  finance  companies  owned  by  banking 
organizations  had  capital  ratios  similar  to those  of the  finance 
companies  not affiliated  with banks.  Thus, banking  organizations 
appear  to  have  had  some  success  in meeting  market  standards  in 
their nonbank  operations. -  37  - 
Table 1 
Assets,  Liabilities,  and Capital  in all U.S. Commercial  Banks 
Mid-year  1992 
(All figures are in billions  of dollars) 
Cash, reserves,  and 









Other assets  449 
Total assets  3418 
U.S. Commercial  Banks 
Domestic  transaction 








deposits  1626 
Foreign  deposits  304 
Other  liabilities  531 
Total liabilities  3171 
Equity  capital  247 - 38 - 
Table 2 
U.S. Commercial  Banks 
Under  a Narrow  Banking  System 
Mid-year  1992 
(In billions  of dollars) 
Narrow  Banks 
Cash,  reserves,  and 
due from balances  191 
Transaction  accounts  710 
Securities  519 










Other Assets  315 
Total assets  2252 
Domestic  Credit Affiliates 
Liabilities  (Commercial 
paper,  uninsured 
deposits,  long-term 
debt, etc.)  2057 
Equity  capital  195 
International  Banks 
Foreign  holdings  of 
cash and due from 
balances 
Foreign  securities 
84 
30 
Foreign  deposits  304 
Other  liabilities  100 
Total  liabilities  404 
Foreign  loans  208 
Other  assets  120 
Total assets  442 
Equity  capital  38 